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IN C O M PL E T E  “C O N T R A C T S” IN R E C E N T  CA SES 
The Problem
The maxims ‘there cannot be a contract to make a contract” and 
“ the courts will not make a contract for parties who have themselves 
failed to do so” reflect a philosophy of contract rooted in the idea of 
subjective coalescence of rreelv consenting wills. They reveal a reluct­
ance to impose contractual obligation without a promisor’s deliberate 
consent to all its terms. If uncritically applied, however, these maxims 
can cause injustice. Business men often wish to stabilize future 
outlets and sources of supply by contracting for the sale or purchase of 
goods for delivery at distant dates, but if markets are volatile they may 
hesitate to tie themselves to inflexible prices; not all lone term contracts 
are designed to throw the risk of rising prices on the seller or of falling 
prices on the buyer: the parties may prefer to leave prices to be set 
before deliveries bv agreement or by some other standard.1 It is also not 
unusual for business men to agree on subject matter, priccs and quan­
tities, but to reserve precise arrangements for transportation for later 
settlement. Then, too, commercial people often use terms that are 
meaningful to themselves, but whicli are well nigh unintelligible to 
those wno are unfamiliar with the ways of the trade. Agreements such 
as these, though vague and imprecise, are no doubt concluded in the be­
lief that binding commitments have been made. Thev create reasonable 
expectations of legal recognition and enforcement. The maxims quoted 
do, however, threaten disappointment of the hopes so aroused.
My theme is the judicial resolution of the tension between the 
desire to support reasonable expectations created by business and private 
agreements however ineligantly phrased and reluctance to impose 
contractual duties not completely and voluntarily defined and accepted. 
T h e interests in conflict in such cases often are not susceptible of easy 
adjustment by application of broad maxims. More specifically, the 
problems to be considered arise out of these types of agreement:
1. The parties may in so manv words agree to agree on a 
term whose content is for the time being left indeterm­
inate.
2. The agreement may contain no specific undertaking 
to negotiate further, but one so phrased as to suggest that 
such negotiation was intended.
3. Though a term may be so worded as in its context to 
indicate finality of bargain, its meaning may be very 
obscure.
1. F u lle r : B asic C on tract Law , pp. 87-89.
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Obviously these problems arc but species of a general category which 
includes the whole variety of problems centering around determination 
of the precise moment at which negotiation ends and legal right and 
duty begin.
Specific Agreement to Agree
Discussion of the specific agreement to agree on a term in an other­
wise settled document may conveniently begin with a well known case, 
May and Butcher, Lim ited v. T he K ing* A very detailed agreement 
had been made for the purchase by the plaintiff from a government com­
mission of all tentage Decoming surplus during a defined period. Price 
was to be as agreed from time to time. All disputes arising out of the 
agreement were to be submitted to arbitration. After several shipments of 
tentage had been taken at agreed prices, the commission refused to 
proceed, and the plaintiff sued. The defence was that there was no 
contract because or the agreement to agree on price. This contention 
was sought to be answered by submitting that, absent agreement, the 
price by implication would be a reasonable one, and its reasonableness 
arbitrable. Reliance was placed on the section of the English Sale 
of Goods Act corresponding to our s. 9:
“9. (1) The price in a contract of sale may be fixed by 
the contract, or may Ik * left to be fixed in manner thereby 
agreed, or may be determined by the course of dealing between 
the parties.
(2) Where the price is not determined in accordance with 
the foregoing provisions the buyer must pay a reasonable 
price . . ."3
On the basis of this section it was argued that the price was a 
reasonable one, but the argument was rejected. Lord Warrington 
of Clyffe’s answer was that to implv a reasonable price would not 
be “to imply something about which the parties have been silent; 
it would be to insert in the contract a stipulation contrary to that for 
which thev have bargained . . . not the result of their own agreement, 
but possibly the verdict of a jury, or some other means of ascertaining 
the stipulated price. T o  do that would be to contradict the express 
terms of the document which they have signed.”4 And the arbitration 
clause was inoperative simply because there was no contract. Lord Buck- 
master said that the “clause refers ‘disputes with reference to or arising 
out of this agreement’ to arbitration, but until the price has been 
fixed, the agreement is not there.”6
Thus the plaintiff failed; in the often quoted words of Viscount 
Dunedin: “To De a good contract there must be a concluded bargain,
2. [18341 2 K .B . 17 (H .L. 1929).
3. Sale of Goods A c t, R .S .N .B . 1952, c . 199.
4. [19341 2 K .B . 17, a t p. 22.
5. Ibid., a t p. 20.
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and a concluded contract is one which settles everything that is 
necessary to be settled and leaves nothing to be settled bv agreement 
between the parties.”6
An express term to agree on price may not be fatal, however, 
otherwise Foley v. Classiquc Coaches, Lim itec1 would not have been 
decided as it was. The owner of adjoining lots, on one of which was 
a filling station, sold the other to the defendant for a bus depot. Part 
of the consideration was a promise to buy all gasoline required bv busc^ 
operating out of the depot from the vendor and not elsewhere at 
priccs to be agreed from time to time; differences under the agree­
ment were referable to arbitration. The defendant took his gasoline 
from the plaintiff for three years at agreed priccs, but then refused to 
buy any more, and relied on M ay &  Butcher v. T he King. An im­
portant difference, however, was that immediately the agreement was 
made in the Foley case title to the lot vested so that there was at once 
substantial performance. T o  give business efficacy to the contract it 
was necessary to imply a promise that, failing agreement, the price 
would be a reasonable one.
Similarly in British Bank Ltd. v. Novinex L td .8 the Court of Ap­
peal imposed contractual liability despite the inclusion in a letter 
from the defendant of a proposal to pay “an agreed commission” for 
a stipulated service. The defendant, wishing to buy oilskins, wrote to 
the plaintiff offering to pay a commission in respect to a consignment 
of such skins if the plaintiff would put the defendant in contact with 
a supplier. The letter stated: “W e also undertake to cover you with 
an agreed commission on any other business transacted with your 
friends. In return for this you are to put us in direct contact with your 
friends.” This the plaintiff did. The defendant entered into further 
transactions with the supplier so introduced, but refused to pay the 
plaintiff commissions because none had been agreed. The Court of 
Appeal, finding for the plaintiff, applied the legal principle Denning, 
}. at first instance had extracted from the earlier cases on agreements 
to agree, though on its application to the facts the Court differed 
from his Lordsnip. Denning, J. had said that if an essential term is to 
be agreed and there is no express or implied provision for its solution 
there is no contract. He proceeded:
‘‘In seeing whether there is an implied provision for its 
solution, however, there is a difference between an arrange­
ment which is wholly executory on both sides, and one which 
has been executed on one side or the other. In the ordinary 
way, if there is an arrangement to supply goods at a price ‘to 
be agreed,’ or to perform services on terms ‘to be agreed,’ then 
although, while the matter is still executory, there may be no 
binding contract, nevertheless, if it is executed on one side, 
that is, if the one does his part without having come to an
6. Ib id ., a t p. 21.
7. [ 1934(1 2 K .B . l  (C .A .).
8. (19491 1 K  B . 623 (C .A . 1948); [19491 1 A ll E .R . 155.
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agreement as to the price or the terms, then the law will 
say that there is necessarily implied, from the conduct of the 
parties, a contract that, in default of agreement, a reasonable
sum is to be paid.”»
This rule, with respcct, poses a difficulty. It appears to mean that 
a bilateral executory agreement containing as an essential term an un­
qualified promise to pay a price to be agreed in return for the promise 
of an act is not a contract, Dut is transformed into one by performance 
of the act, the promise becoming not simply one to pay a sum to be 
agreed but also to pay a reasonable sum failing agreement. It would 
follow that before performance of the act either party could resile. There 
is no contract until the act is done (or possibly begun);10 but, the act 
done, a promise is at once implied different in a material respect from 
the original non-contractual promise which was simply to pay a price 
to be agreed. Actually, on the facts of the Novinex case, the defendant’s 
letter might have been interpreted as the offer of a unilateral contract—  
an express offer of a promise to pay a commission to be agreed, coupled 
with an implied offer to pay a reasonable commission if agreement 
were not reached, in return for an introduction. Alternatively, if the 
agreement were bilateral but failed as a contract, recovery for an act 
done under it might have been permitted in quasi-contract bv way of 
restitution of a benefit conferred under a “contract” that failed. Professor 
Williston, writing of the effect of part performance upon an indefinite 
promise given in exchange for a definite one said this: “Let it be sup­
posed first that the promise which originally was definite is performed; 
this cannot make the indefinite promise enforceable but may give rise 
to a quasi contractual obligation to pay the fair value of what has been 
received.”11 Craven-Ellis v. Canons, Ltd. 12 and the Degelman case13 
might afford precedents.
Another example of a contract containing an express term to 
agree is the Ontario case, D eLaval Co. Ltd. v. B loom field .14 Here the 
pricc of the article sold was definite, but the manner of payment was 
not: the price was $400, of which $200 were payable on a named date, 
“balancc to be arranged”. The vendor succeeded in an action for the 
first instalment, despite the plea that the agreement was too indefinite. 
Several possible explanations of the result are suggested bv the judg­
ment. One seemed to be that there was a contractfor a definite price, 
but with payment subject to a condition precedent —  agreement on
9. [1949] 1 K .B . 623, a t pp. 629 and 630.
10. See Errington  v. E rrln jto n  and Woods, [1952] 1 K .B . 290 (C .A . 1951), per D en n in g , 
L .J .  at p. 295; [1952] 1 A ll E .R . 149; b u t see D iw itn  v. H elicopter Exp loration  Co. L td .. 
[1955! 5 D .L .R . 404, per R an d , J .  a t  p. 410.
11. W illiston  on C o n tracts  (R evised  ed. 1936) s. 49, a t p. 139.
12. 119361 2 K .B . 403 (C .A .) ; [1936 ] 2 AU E .R . 1066.
13. D e ie m in  v. G uaranty Trust Co. •( C anada and C on stan tln eaa, [1954] S .C .R . 725; [19541
3 D .L .R . 785.
14. 11938] O .R . 294 (C .A .) ; [1938 ] 3 D .L .R . 405.
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the mode of payment. Bv refusing to agree the buyer discharged the 
seller from the need to show performance of the condition: the price 
thus became payable at once. Another explanation might be that refusal 
to agree was a breach which vested in the vendor an immediate right to 
damages, the measure being the contract price.15
The D eLaval case has been condemned and defended by learned 
commentators.18 The British Columbia courts have refused to follow 
it. In the recent case, Chertwick v. M oore and Dean,'1 for example, 
the trial judge expressly stated that it wras not an authority in British 
Columbia. In the Cherew'ick case, though the amount of royalties to be 
paid bv the defendant to an inventor for a license under his patent were 
fixed, and a cash price of S I0,000 agreed, it was held that the agreement 
was not a contract because the $10,000 was to be financed by a promis­
sory note on terms to be settled by the solicitors of the parties. “ . . . 
where the parties have not settled a method of payment out have left 
it to be agreed upon later . . .  a British Columbia Court cannot treat 
the refusal of the buyer to enter into an agreement as to the method 
of payment as an act entitling the vendor to immediate payment.”1“
In theory there is of course no reason why a promise to negotiate 
for price or any other term should not be enforceable if supported 
bv consideration. Such a right may be valuable and bargained for. Lord 
W right said as much in Hillas v. Arcos.u* However, an agreement that 
price or some other term is to be as agreed is not a promise to negoti­
ate. In Colwell &  Jennings Ltd. v. ] . W. Creaghan Co. L td .?0 it was 
argued that a lessor’s refusal to negotiate where the lessee purported 
to exercise an option to take a new lease on terms to be agreed before 
a named date, the lessor undertaking not to lease to another during that 
period, was an anticipatory breach of an implied promise to negotiate 
and that the lessee was entitled to at least nominal damages. But Harri­
son, }. described the lessor’s promise as illusory. “Contract” is mirage 
where unfettered powrer not to perform is reserved by the promisor. Of 
course, if a promise to negotiate had been implied, power would have 
been fettered, and in principle nominal damages recoverable.
If Foley v. Classique Coaches and the Novinex case are right, an 
agreement to agree on price may in a fit context be construed as im­
plying a reasonable price failing agreement. The maxim “there cannot 
De a contract to make a contract”, though not inconsistent with these 
holdings, would mislead if the possibility of such implication were 
overlooked. But there is a better reason for handling the maxim with 
care: it is really quite inaccurate. As Sargent, L.J. said in Chillingworth
15. S ee  also Hall v. C onder. 2 C. & B . (N .S .) 22, per W illiam s, J .  a t  p. 40; 140 E .R . 318, 
a t p. 326.
16. G ord on , <1939) 17 C an. B . R ev. 205; C .A .W ., (19391 17 Can. B . R ev . 208.
17. [19551 2 D .L .R . 492.
18. Ib id ., a t  p. 501.
19. (1932) 147 L .T . 503.
20. (1951) 28 M .P .R . 40 (N .B . Ch. 1950); 11951] 4 D .L .R . 840.
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v. E sche: 1 ‘It should be ‘contract to enter into an indeterminate contract/ 
The court will enforce a contract to enter into a determinate contract 
as for example to renew a lease.”21 Or it might be added to give a 
lease or a conveyance. The terms of the lease or conveyance would, how­
ever, have to be certain. The New Brunswick case, Post v. Bean, 22 is 
illustrative. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant company had 
agreed to give a lease of fishing rights fronting on the defendant’s land 
adjoining the Tobique River until such time as the company should 
build piers and booms at the location. These works were not constructed 
and the defendant granted the exclusive fishine rights to another. The 
plaintiff sought a declaration that he was entitlea to these rights. Though 
the allegation was traversed, the trial judge held that the alleged agree­
ment had been made and that it could be performed by the grant of a 
lease for the life of the plaintiff or for ninety-nine years, subject to term­
ination on the happening of the event stipulated. The Court of Appeal 
reversed (Harrison, J. dissenting) holding that the duration of the lease 
was too uncertain for specific performance. Michaud, C .J.Q .B ., said:
“The Court will decree specific performance of an agreement 
for lease. . . . only where such agreement has the essential 
elements required for a valid lease, and the same are admitted 
or distinctly proved. The essential terms of an agreement for 
a lease are:
(1) The identification of the lessor and the lessee.
(2) The premises to be leased.
(3) The commencement and duration of the term.
(4) The rent or other consideration to be paid.”23 .
Vague Terms
No express agreement to agree may be present, yet a term may 
be so vague as to suggest that tne parties must have intended further 
agreement or, if there is no such suggestion, it may be difficult or im-
Í>ossible to give the term a reasonable meaning. Lord W right, in a amiliar passage, said of the very sketchy agreement in Hillas v. Arcos 
that “business men often record the most important agreements in 
crude and summary fashion; modes of expression sufficient and clear to 
them in the course of their business may appear to those unfamiliar 
with the business far from complete or precise. It is accordingly the duty 
of the court to construe such documents fairly and broadly, without 
being too astute or subtle in finding defects; . . ”24 Courts can and 
should where possible save such agreements by “the implication of 
what is just ana reasonable to be ascertained by tne court as a matter of 
machinery where the contractual intention is clear but the contract is 
silent on some detail.”26 The implied term is the judicial tool used 
to save business agreements vague and sketchy in their expression.
21. [ 19241 1 Ch. 97. a t  p. 100.
22. (1947) 20 M .P.R . 168 (N .B .C .A . 1946). a f f d  [19471 3 D .L .R . 513 (C an. S. C t.t .
23. (19471 20 M .P.R . 168, a t pp. 192 and 193.
24. (19321 147 L .T . 503, a t p. 514.
25. Ibid.
U. N. B. LAW  JOURNAL 43
But it is a tool that requires malleable material. The facts in the 
much discussed case, G. Scam m ell and N ephew , Lim ited v. H. C. and 
] . G. O us ton?* must at first sight have seemed workable. The plaintiff 
agreed to bin a lorry from the defendants for £268; he was to be allowed 
£100 on the turn-in of a second-hand truck, balance payable on hire- 
purchase terms over two years. Later the defendants refused to deliver 
and the plaintiff sued for damage for breach of contract. The defence 
was that the agreement was not a contract because of the indefiniteness 
of the hire-purchase terms. All the judges in the lower courts agreed 
there was a contract: the hire-purchase contract would be such as 
would be reasonable in the trade though the judges differed widely 
in their views on what form it s.iculd take. The House of Lords, re­
versing, were of opinion that there are no usual or ordinary hire-purchasc 
terms in the automobile trade; sometimes only two parties are in­
volved, the seller and buyer; often a finance company is a party; and 
the actual terms relating to repair, repossession on default and interest 
vary. Again, in this case, there was no past course of dealing between 
the parties as there had been m Hillas v. Arcos. Lord W right found two 
fatal defects in the agreement: either the parties never got beyond ne­
gotiation (they must nave intended to agree later on the hire-purchase 
terms )or, even if, in intention, they had concluded their bargain it 
was too indefinite to ground legal obligation.
The Scam m ell case leads naturally to a series of Canadian eases 
dealing with agreements to convey land, part of the price to be fin­
anced by a purchaser’s mortgage. A agrees in writing to sell Blackacrc 
to B for $20,000 payable $10,000 in cash, balance on mortgage at six 
percent. Is this a contract or is the agreement for the mortgage too 
vague?
Only two of the series of cases will be considered. In Jackson v. 
M acaulay, Nicholls, M aitland &  Com pany Lim ited and Willettr' there 
was an agreement for the purchase of realty; the price was $7,500, pay­
able $4,000 in cash, balance by assuming a first mortgage of $3,500 at 
six percent. No mortgage existed at the time of the agreement but 
there was a contract of sale under which payments were still owing. 
The purchaser repudiated and successfully sued to recover a deposit, 
the court holding that the agreement was too indefinite because of un­
certainty over the identity of the mortgagee and the length of the mort­
gage term. InThomson Groceries Ltd. v. Scott~H on the other hand an 
agreement “to purchase these premises for the sum of seven thousand 
three hundred and seventy-five dollars . . .  Terms $4,000.00 cash, balance 
1st mortgage. Interest at 5% per annum” was held to be a contract. 
The mortgagee would be the seller; the mortgage deed would take the 
form provided in T he Short Forms of M ortgages A ct,-29 and, accord­
26. [1941] A  C. 251; [1941] 1 All E .R . 14.
27. [1942 ] 2. W .W .R . 33 (B .C .C .A .); [1942] 2 D .L .R . 609.
28. [1943] O R . 290 (C .A .) ; [1943 ] 3 D .L.R . 25.
29. R .S.O . 1950. c . 362.
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ing to Kcllock, J. the principal would be payable on demand. It was, 
of course, urged that neither party would have contemplated demand 
liability, but his Lordship held that such liability was the consequence 
either of the covenant read into the mortgage by the Ontario Act 
or of the obligation to repay raised by the mortgage loan itself.30
One might speculate on the enforceability in New Brunswick 
of an agreement like the one in the Scott case. Against enforceability 
could be urged the lack of a specified mortgage period and of agreement 
011 taxes, insurance and power of sale. In this Province there is no 
statutory form of mortgage nor is there in practice a standard mortgage 
deed.31 On the other hand the rule that the mortgage principal would, 
in the absencc of a contrary stipulation, be payable on oemand, if 
such is the law, would seem applicable, and our statutory powers of 
sale and insurance could be invoked. Interest might be at the legal 
rate.32 T he lesson seems to be, however, that in drafting an sgre^ment 
of sale, the solicitor ought to specify at least the amount of the purchase 
monev mortgage, the parties, the term, rate and times of payment of 
interest and any special convenants desired.
An agreement, though obviously complete in intention contemplat­
ing no further negotiation, may yet contain a meaningless clause. Is 
such a defect fatal? Nicolene Ltd. v. Simmonds 83 is a recent authority
30. The auth orities cited by K ellock , J .  for the proposition th a t the m ortgage loan itself  
creates  a dem and obligation seem  Indecisive. In F arq u h ar v. M orris, < 1797* 7 T .R . 
124; 101 E .R . 889, it was held th at a bond w ith no d ate of p ay m en t stipulated c r e a te d ^  
a present obligation. King v. King and Ennis, (1735) 3 P . W m s. 358; 24 E .R . 1100, 
held th at ev ery  m ortgage im plies a debt though th ere  Is no bond or cov en an t. N either  
case specifically indicates th at the obligation w ould be conditional on a dem and. In  
Button v. S u ttcn , (1883) 22 Ch. D. 511 (C .A . 1882i, Jessel. M .R ., said in a d ictum  a t  
p. 516: " . . .  every  m ortgage contains w ithin itself, so to speak, a personal liability  
to repay the am ount ad v an ced .” The actu al holding of th e  case  w as th a t the  
lim itation period on the exp ress covenant to pay on dem and involved in the case  
ran  from  the date of the last paym ent m ade before th e  action . K ellock , J . ’s cita tio n  
from  Corpus Ju ris , 41 C .J. 396, on the oth er hand, read s: “ . . . if no tim e is fixed  
in the m ortgage the law will supply the om itted elem ent and prescrib e th a t p erfo rm ­
ance tak e place within a reasonable tim e after d em an d .” H tgfina ▼. M cLaughlan, 
reported in Russell's Nova Scotia Equity Cases 441, is an au th o rity  for saying th a t  
if no tim e is m entioned an obligation arises, but it is not helpful on w h eth er it is 
perform able on dem and. Nor is the law alto geth er clear  on th e  legal effect of a  
prom ise to pay on dem and. In C anada P erm an en t M ortgage C orporation v. Saynor, 
119461 O.W .N. 406, decided since the Thom son G roceries case , th e  A ssistant M aster  
said a t pp. 411 and 412: “T he law appears to be th a t w here a m ortgage is payable  
on dem and the righ t of action accru es im m ediately It Is execu ted , and unless th ere  
is a stipulation to the co n trary  a dem and is not considered  to  be a condition  
preced ent to the bringing of the a ctio n ."  W akefield and B arn sley  Union B an k , Lim ited  
v. Y ates, 119161 1 Ch. 452 (C .A .) and In re J .  B row n ’s E state . B row n  v. B row n , [18931
2 Ch. 300 w ere cited. In the B row n case a distinction w as tak en  betw een, on th e  
one hand, “a present debt and a prom ise to pay on dem and” , w here dem and w as 
said not to be a condition precedent to actio n , and , on th e  o th er, “ a prom ise to  pay  
a collateral sum  on request, for then the request ought to  be m ade before actio n  
b rought.” In the W akefield case an action to foreclose a m ortg ag e given to secu re  
a dem and loan w as held barred  because th e  lim itation period had ru n  out sin ce  
the last acknow ledgem ent. B o th  the B rew n  and W akefield cases m ust now  be read  
in the light of Lloyds B ank Ltd . ▼. M argolls, [1954] 1 W .L .R . 644 (C h .). In th a t case  
a dem and m ortgage collateral to a running acco u n t betw een bank and cu sto m er  
w as held to be actionable w here the dem and w as m ade w ithin, b u t the loan before, 
the lim itation period. T he case could have been decided on th e  basis of the d is­
tinction taken  in the Brow n case, but U pjohn, J .  said th a t he p referred  to base his 
jud gm ent on the broad ground th at purely  as a m atter of co n stru ction  the co v en an t  
to pay on dem and m eant ju st that.
31. See B u yers ▼. Begg, (1951) 3 W .W .R . (N .S.) 673 IB .C .C .A  ) ;  [19521 1 D .L.R . 313.
32. See B u y ers ▼. B egg, [1952] 1 D .L.R . 313, per R obertson , J .A . a t p. 316. In terest A ct,
R S.C. 1952, c. 156, s. 3.
33. [19531 1 Q B. 543 (C .A .); [1953] 1 All E .R . 822.
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for saying it is not. In an exchange of letters containing detailed terms 
the plaintiff offered to buy specified goods; the defendant wrote pur­
porting to accept the offer but saying “I assume that we are in agree­
ment that the usual conditions of acceptance apply.” There were no 
“usual conditions of acceptance” between the parties, so the clause 
lacked meaning. In holding that nonetheless there was a contract, in 
effect that a blue pencil could be drawn through the offending words, 
Denning, L.J. said:
"In the present case there was nothing yet to be agreed.
There was nothing left to further negotiation. All that 
happened was that the parties agreed that ‘the usual con­
ditions of acceptance apply.’ Thai clause was so vague and un­
certain as to be incapable of any precise meaning. It is 
C early severable from  the rest o f the contract. It can be 
rejected without im pairing the sense o r  reasonableness 
of the contract as a w hole, and it should be so rejected. The 
contract should be held good and the clause ignored. The 
parties themselves treated the contract as subsisting. They 
regarded it as creating binding obligations between them; 
and it would be most fortunate if the law should say other­
wise. ”*•* (Italics added).
The test of validity is this: Is the meaningless clause collateral to 
the main purpose and can it be severed without impairing the sense of 
what remains? On this ground his Lordship distinguished Scainmell 
v. Ouston insofar as that decision rested on the vagueness of the hire- 
purchase clause: “It [the term in this case] was clcarly severable from 
the rest of the contract, whereas the term in G. Scam m ell &  Nephew  
Ltd. v. Ouston was not.” 1''
Conclusion
These cases may be considered from the viewpoint of either 
advocate or solicitor. From both aspects one might almost be forced 
to the traditional counsel of despair: “W hether an agreement is so 
vague as to be devoid of legal efficacy depends 011 the wording of the 
particular clause read in the context of the document as a whole and 
against the relevant factual background.” In this tvpe of case such a 
formula is not without utility: it permits a relatively free weighing of the 
conflicting interests involved and leaves room for protection of reason­
able expectations. But more precise formulations seem possible.
For counsel deciding whether to litigate an agreement containing 
a clause that the parties agree to agree on price or some other term, 
the presumption is that the agreement is not a contract for negotiation 
is not ended. It may, however, be possible to imply a promise to pay a
34. [1953] 1 Q .B . 543, a t p. 552.
35. Ib id . See  also Paren to  and Paren to  v. Jacobsen , [1955] 2 D .L .R . 510 (B .C .i and 
com pare Bishop & B a x te r , Ltd . v. A nglo-Eastern Trading & Industrial Co., I.td., 119441. 
K .B . 12 (C .A. 1943); [1943 ] 2 A ll E .R . 598 and British  E lectric and Associated Indus­
tries (C ardiff) Ltd . v. P atley  Pressings L td ., [1953] 1 W .L .R . 280 (Q .B .); [1953] 1 A ll 
E .R . 94.
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reasonable price or some other reasonable term failing agreement in 
order to give efficacy to the agreement. Such implication is more likely 
when citncr party has wholly or substantially executed his promise, 
though the precise legal basis of this distinction is debatable. Again, 
an agreement to agree on a relatively insignificant item may be ignored 
as de minimis.*™ Recent important advances in the law of restitution to 
prevent unjust enrichment might also be explored.
A solicitor drafting a contract should of course avoid the agree­
ment to agree. If the client insists that firm agreement on price is not 
presently feasible, it may be possible to inscr1 an agreement to agree on 
pricc with a provision that failing agreement the price should be reason­
able and arbitrable or fixed in accordance with some clear formula: for 
example, in a long term lease of commercial premises, it might be 
possible to set a fixed minimum with an added variable rental tied to 
sales.
If the challenged clause is vague, the courts will tend to uphold 
it b\ implying what is reasonable if it dearly appears that the parties in­
tended to strike a final bargain. Much will depend in such cases on 
the skill of counsel in developing by evidence the details of business 
background which give meaning to the apparently obscure. The solicitor 
will of coursc avoid obscurity in his drafting.
And to concludc — if a clausc is meaningless the contract may be 
saved by its severance if a clear excision is possible and the clause is 
relatively unimportant.
William F. Ryan, 
University of New Brunswick, 
Faculty of Law
36. W illiston  on C o n tracts  (R evised  ed. 19361 s. 48.
